A theory of noncooperative and cooperative games, that parallels the classical theory [l], [2] but makes no use of utility theory, is outlined in this note.
Games in normal form.
The following definition seems suitable for our purpose (see, e.g., [3, § 5] ). DEFINITION (jff<(j J ^0, ff*(*)) $ JRS for all j< G S*.
This is Nash's definition [2] adjusted to our case. (2.12) (sL4)G^)^(#^|4), £*(*!$)£# and *<(4)>0.
The validity of (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) for Z\S) follows from (2.6), (2.7) and (2.12). By Theorem 2.2 there exists SoG § such that Z^so) -0 for all iGN. We claim that § 0 is an equilibrium point for G. Let iGN. II 4(4) >0 then ' There exists no utility function on X which represents R in the sense of (2.14), while the relation R> derived from TL by (2.13.1) satisfies (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) . (This example is a modification of an example of R. J. Aumann.)
We plan also to discuss the nonclassical approaches to utility theory 3. Two-person zero-sum games. In this section we use our notation to formulate some well-known properties of two-person zerosum games (see, e.g., [6, Chapter 4] 4. Cooperative games. An important step towards the liberation of the theory of cooperative games from utility theory was made in [7] . Pushing it further we define: A "dominance relation" can now be defined on X: 
